While researchers have recognized the importance of social movements for market emergence, we know little about the mechanisms through which mobilized secondary stakeholders trigger interest in new markets among incumbent firms. We investigate the possibility that social movements create and amplify a polluting technology stigma that leads incumbents to develop a stigma dilution strategy, which is associated with entering a new market. We also examine the contingent factors that enhance the positive environmental consequences of technology stigma. Our quantitative analyses of the adoption of green power programs by U.S. electric utilities and the subsequent growth in green power consumption allows us to test hypotheses about the effect of technology stigma, secondary stakeholders and moderator effects. The analysis confirms our hypotheses, speaking to the literature on movements, organizations and markets.
Introduction
How do social movements shape new markets, like the markets for the production of 'green' or renewable energy sources? Studies have shown that markets for environmental sustainability products are shaped by pressure from different stakeholders (Berry and Rondinelli, 1998; Delmas et al., 2007; Vasi and King, 2012) . Research has shown that these markets are associated with changes in firms' strategies (Hart and Gautam 1996; Russo and Fouts 1997; Dowell et al., 1999; Konar and Cohen, 1997; Porter and Kramer 2003; Margolis and Walsh 2003) , anticipated legislation (Lawrence and Morell 1995) , company values and political ideology (Wood 1991; Lawrence and Morell 1995; Buchholz 1998; Gupta et al., 2016) , or specific psychological characteristics of the CEOs (Tang et al., 2015; Petrenko et al., 2016) .
Relatedly, the new literature on social movements and market emergence suggests that activists frequently contribute to the growth of new markets (e.g. Lounsbury et al., 2003; Hiatt et al., 2009; King and Pearce, 2010) . Most of this research contends that new markets are spurred by the arrival of new ventures (Navis and Glynn, 2010; Dubuisson-Quellier, 2013) . But, new research suggests that incumbent firms may be those best positioned to take advantage of new technologies and generate market growth (Durand and Georgallis, 2018) . The question remains as to why incumbent firms embrace new technologies that are, at least initially, supported by social movements and other fringe customer groups and do not yet have strong consumer demand. We suggest in this article that activist groups encourage this shift to a new technology by stigmatizing the old technologies that incumbent firms use. Firms seek to disassociate themselves from the technologies that carry the stigma. Technology stigma, therefore, creates an opportunity for firms to try new technologies that do not have the same negative associations.
A growing body of research has shown that firms in stigmatized industries frequently employ stigma management strategies (Devers et al., 2009) . Stigma conveys that 'an organization possesses a fundamental, deep-seated flaw that deindividuates and discredits the organization' (Devers et al., 2009, p. 155) , which leads firm to distance themselves from those practices and engage in impression management in order to rehabilitate their image (Carberry and King, 2012) . Some firms involved in stigmatized activities such as building nuclear reactors choose to reduce or terminate their involvement in them (Piazza and Perretto, 2015) . Others, however, may not have the option of disengaging in favor or less controversial activities due to a variety of reasons: switching costs, path dependence or identity concerns (Vergne and Durand, 2010; Phillips et al., 2013) . In these cases, firms in stigmatized categories may attempt to improve their organizational image and dilute the categories by choosing to diversify. Tobacco firms, for example, can 'dilute' the stigma and decrease public vilification by diversifying into the food industry (Hudson, 2008) .
Similarly, firms involved in the arms industry contain disapproval and distract stakeholder attention to the stigma by entering a non-stigmatized civilian category (Vergne, 2012) . Although existing research has examined symbolic responses to organizational stigma, such as adopting defensive practices or impression management techniques (Carberry and King, 2012; Desai, 2011; McDonnell and King, 2013) , other types of responses, such as moving into a new market, have not been thoroughly investigated. Despite the fact that activist stakeholders believe that a perceived stigma can negatively impact organizational identities and 'nudge' companies into sustainability-related activities (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007) , we have little evidence of the role that stigma plays in shaping entry into new markets for sustainability products.
Following existing research on categorization and stigmatization, we define stigma as a vilifying label that contaminates organizations' images (Devers et al., 2009 ). In the case of industries, stigmatized categories are 'groups of organizations, such as arms or tobacco producers, whose liability prompts out-group members to keep their distance to avoid a potentially harmful association' (Vergne 2012 (Vergne , p. 1030 . Stigma, however, may affect not only producer categories (tobacco, arms, etc.) but also producer technologies. This is particularly the case for polluting technologies used in industries that are frequent targets of environmental activism: pesticides in agriculture, mountaintop removal in mining, coal burning in electric power, etc. To attenuate the polluting technology stigma incumbent firms may choose to develop a stigma dilution strategy, which is an attempt to improve negative perceptions resulting from the use of a 'dirty' or 'dangerous' technology through the adoption of a 'clean' or 'safe' technology.
In examining the adoption of stigma dilution strategies we speak to two different literatures. On the one hand, we build on research on social movements and corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Rao et al., 2000; Sine et al., 2007; King and Soule, 2007; King, 2008; Soule, 2009; King and Pearce, 2010; Vasi and King, 2012) and the literature that examines how challenger-incumbent interactions shapes the evolution of a field (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012) . We argue that secondary stakeholders-or stakeholders who 'do not engage in direct economic exchange with firms or have a formal contractual bond or direct legal authority over firms' (Vasi and King, 2012, p. 576 )-have both direct and indirect influences on moving into a new market based on clean technology. More specifically, incumbent firms are likely to adopt clean technologies not only if they are pressured by challenging secondary stakeholders but also if this pressure is coupled with technology stigma. On the other hand, we draw upon research on organizational identity and reputation building (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Fombrun, 1996; Roberts and Dowling, 2002) and argue that firms facing a polluting technology stigma are likely to invest in 'clean' technologies to avoid reputational damage due to the threat of stigma. Thus, our analysis identifies a reputation-motivated process that contributes to the previously observed paradox of firms that simultaneously engage in 'bad deeds' and in 'good deeds' (Lange and Washburn 2012; Mattingly and Berman 2006; Tang et al., 2015) .
Empirically, this article examines the adoption of green power programs by U.S. electric utilities and the subsequent growth in green power consumption. We use a longitudinal dataset from the U.S. Department of Energy and various other sources to show that utilities have responded to this stigma in part by adopting green technology and developing green power programs. We test hypotheses about the effect of the dirty coal stigma on the adoption and growth of green power programs, about the effect of environmental organizations on the adoption and growth of green power programs, and about the moderating effect of the dirty coal stigma on environmental NGOs' influence.
Theory and hypotheses

Polluting technology stigma
Research has shown that 'markets for virtue' (Vogel, 2006) can emerge when firms attempt to gain a competitive advantage by adopting CSR activities (Hart and Gautam, 1996; Russo and Fouts, 1997; Dowell et al., 1999; Konar and Cohen, 1997; Porter and Kramer, 2003; Margolis and Walsh, 2003) . The adoption of CSR activities could result from a strategy that is either deliberate or reactive. In the first case, the strategy originates in the 'mind ' (personality, values, beliefs, etc.) of the CEOs (Tang et al., 2015; Petrenko et al., 2016) and is shaped primarily by company values (Wood, 1991; Buchholz, 1998; Lawrence and Morell, 1995) and political ideology (Gupta et al., 2016) . In the second case, the strategy is developed mainly as a response to external events such as legislation (Lawrence and Morell, 1995) or stakeholder pressures that result in stigma (Berry and Rondinelli, 1998; Delmas et al., 2007; Vasi and King, 2012) . Thus, while some business firms adopt CSR activities because of intrinsic moral considerations, many adopt them because they are 'stigmatized as "bad guys" and called on to stop manipulation and exploitation' (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007, p. 1103) .
Stigma can result from companies' involvement in specific activities (e.g. building nuclear power plants) or membership in certain categories (e.g. arms manufacturers). To manage stigma, companies may adopt strategies focused on reducing involvement in stigmatized activities (Piazza and Perretto, 2015) , or on diversifying into non-stigmatized categories (Vergne, 2012 ). Yet, stigma can also result from the use of a specific technology, such as technologies that are major contributors to pollution. Companies may choose to dilute the pollution technology stigma by replacing 'dirty' with 'clean' technologies; for example, DuPont and other companies switched from technologies that produce chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), which damage the ozone layer, to technologies that produce hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), which are environmentally benign (Maxwell and Briscoe, 1997) . When the replacement of a polluting technology is not an attractive option due to switching costs or path dependence (Vergne and Durand, 2010; Phillips et al., 2013) , companies may also choose to mitigate the stigma by adopting clean technologies-a strategy we term stigma dilution.
Companies are motivated to choose a stigma dilution strategy in order to avoid damaging their organizational identity and reputation, which can ultimately have a negative impact on financial performance (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Fombrun, 1996; Roberts and Dowling, 2002) . To prevent major damage to their reputation, companies facing a polluting technology stigma may choose to counterbalance the bad publicity resulting from the use of polluting technologies with good publicity resulting from the adoption of green technologies. Paradoxically, the impetus to reduce technology stigma leads companies to simultaneously engage in responsible and irresponsible behavior (Lange and Washburn, 2012; Mattingly and Berman, 2006; Tang et al., 2015) .
In the case of the electricity sector, coal-burning power plants present some of the biggest challenges of technology stigma. On the one hand, coal-burning power plants have benefited from many decades of scale economics and learning effects, resulting in competitive advantages in terms of cost, performance and user-friendliness. Thus, as one study noted, while other types of technologies may be cheaper on a total cost basis than new coal fired plants, 'a fully life extended existing coal fired plant is cheaper still on the same basis. Because of sunk costs, a much smaller investment is required to make an existing plant like new than is necessary to build an equivalent new plant from the ground up' (Ellerman, 1996) . Moreover, because coal power plants use steam turbine generators that have been tested for over a century, they have lower failure rates than other technologies such as diesel, gas or wind turbines (Tavner and Xiang, 2005) .
On the other hand, coal-burning power plants emit the most air pollutants and greenhouse gases of all fossil fuels; for example, coal-burning power plants emit approximately twice as much carbon dioxide than natural gas-burning power plants, and significantly more particulates, nitrogen oxides and sulfur oxides (Spath et al., 1999 Owning coal power plants may have a negative impact on utilities' environmental reputation and may even decrease the legitimacy of their green power program for some customers (Demas et al., 2007) . But utilities that own very large and old coal power plants are likely to suffer high levels of stigmatization because these power plants have been blacklisted by environmental groups. Consequently, these utilities have very strong incentives to manage the reputational threat that results from ownership of old and highly polluting coal power plants. To do so, they have two options. First, they could install scrubbers and other types of pollution control technologies on old coal power plants, or even close these plants and replace them with new, less polluting power plants. Second, they could invest in renewable energy projects and adopt green power programs to lower their overall level of pollution, and appear to be greener overall. This option is often attractive because it is a less costly solution than closing old plants or installing pollution control technologies. For example, one of the newest and least expensive pollution control systems, known as regenerativeactivated coke technology (ReACT), costs approximately $275 million per coal burning boiler; by comparison, a wind farm consisting of seven large wind turbines is estimated to cost about $12.6 million. 4 One benefit of adopting green power programs is that it is a relatively low-cost signal of a utility company's willingness to clean up pollution. High-polluting companies may see green power programs as an effective means to symbolically commit to green ideals without having to sink major costs in changing their behavior. Consequently, we expect that utilities with high levels of stigmatization due to ownership of coal power plants that are blacklisted by environmental groups are likely to adopt and develop green power programs.
Hypothesis 1: Utilities that own blacklisted power plants will be more likely to adopt and develop green power programs.
Environmental organizations
As Podobnik (2006, p. 13 challenged PG&E's request to build new nuclear power plants. Using computer models of future electricity demand scenarios, EDF demonstrated in front of California's regulatory commission that customers and investors would benefit more from conservation programs and renewable energy resources than by building new plants (Hirsh, 1999) . During the 1980s, environmental groups advocated for 'demand side management' as a solution for the projected increase in electricity consumption. The first 'collaborative'-a plan for energy-efficiency and demand-side management programs developed in collaboration by environmental groups and electric utilities-was set up in 1988 by the environmental group Conservation Law Foundation and the utility Connecticut Light and Power (Hirsh, 1999, p. 211) . By the end of 1991, over 24 utilities in 10 states had worked with environmental groups to reduce energy consumption through demand-side management programs (Hirsh, 1999: 220) .
During the 1990s, environmental groups increased their pressure on utilities to go beyond conservation measures and invest in renewable energy and pushed more forcefully for renewable energy projects to provide customers with alternative energy sources.
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The history of environmental changes in the electric utility industry is consistent with research that shows that social movement organizations can shape the supply side of producers because they advocate alternative forms of exchange and mobilize broad cultural codes to create new producers (Haveman and Rao, 1997; Schneiberg, 2002; Sine et al., 2005; Bartley, 2007; Haveman et al., 2007; Weber et al., 2008; Sine and Lee, 2009; Hiatt et al., 2009) . Social movement organizations are secondary stakeholders-in most cases, they do not engage in direct economic exchange with firms or have a formal contractual bond or direct legal authority over firms (Vasi and King, 2012) . As such, environmental groups tend to use a diverse set of tactics that leverage the emotional reaction of reference publics, such as consumers, investors or analysts, against a firm (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Fligstein, 1996; Rao et al., 2000; Sine et al., 2007; King and Soule, 2007; King, 2008; Soule, 2009; King and Pearce, 2010) .
Most research on movements and markets has tended to focus on large, multinational companies that affect a broad set of geographically dispersed stakeholders (Weber et al., 2008; Schurman and Munro, 2009; Vasi and King, 2012) . But much activism continues to be locally oriented, embedded in communities and focused on particular municipalities and local businesses (Walsh et al., 1993; Stall and Stoecker, 1998; Lind and Stepan-Norris, 2011) . This localism seems especially prevalent among environmental activists. The strong local orientation of many activists reflects the specific environmental damages that companies cause to specific geographical areas in the form of toxic dumping (Bullard, 1990) , destruction of lands and resources-for example, mountaintop removal (House and Howard, 2009 ) and air pollution (Bullard and Johnson, 2000) .
Applied to the case of electric utilities, a social movement perspective suggests that an elevated level of pollution is also socially constructed by various 'social amplification stations' such as scientists and environmental groups (Kasperson, 1992) . Indeed, numerous environmental organizations attempt to create public awareness about pollution associated with electricity production and to enforce the 'polluter pays' principle. For example, the Environmental Integrity Project (EIP) publishes regular reports on the most polluting power plants and 'combines research, reporting and media outreach to spotlight illegal pollution, 5 See Komanoff (2006) expose political intimidation of enforcement staff and encourage federal and state agencies to take enforcement action to stop these practices'. 6 Moreover, local environmental activists may influence utilities' decision to adopt and develop a green power program in a number of ways. First, they use confrontational tactics such as organizing protests against coal power plants or filing lawsuits against utilities that invest in fossil fuels (Vasi, 2009 (Vasi, , 2011 . Second, environmental activists use nonconfrontational tactics such as forming 'collaboratives' with utilities for reducing energy consumption or negotiating investments in renewable energy. Finally, environmental groups can create demand for products that are differentiated in terms of environmental quality, such as green power programs (Delmas et al., 2007) . Therefore, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2: Local environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) will have a direct positive influence on the adoption and development of green power programs.
Moderator effects of environmental organizations
While we expect that environmental groups will directly influence firms' adoption of green power programs, largely for symbolic purposes, we anticipate that their main effect on market growth will be weak. ENGOs greater influence will be in their moderated influence in enhancing the stigma of owning blacklisted power plants. Even though residents of communities in which electricity producers use coal will disapprove of the technology, the disapproval ought to be even stronger in communities in which ENGOs operate. Our argument builds on recent research on social movements and markets, which shows that social movements influence perceptions various audiences have about what is socially acceptable or risky behavior by companies (Vasi and King, 2012; Carberry and King, 2012; McDonnell and King, 2013) . Inasmuch as stigma itself is a product of mobilized perceptions around socially appropriate behavior, we argue that in communities in which ENGOs are present, the use of coal power will be even more stigmatized. ENGOs, of course, seek to draw attention to this technology and cast the technology in a negative light; for example, EIP raises awareness about coal power pollution by publishing the 'dirty kilowatts' list, while Sierra Club mobilizes anti-coal grassroots activists by organizing the 'Beyond Coal' campaign.
By focusing the public's attention on a technology that has become stigmatized, ENGOs are able to make the practice unacceptable and have made it more difficult for companies to carry on the use of the technology. Companies that use coal technology in areas in which ENGOs are present, then, should be even more likely to find countermeasures to draw attention away from the stigmatized technology. Green power programs, in this sense, are a solution to the stigma mobilized by ENGOs. Heavy polluting utilities located in a region where the environmental movement is strong are likely to adopt green power programs in order to signal to investors, regulators and the general public that they are doing their best to minimize the environmental problems associated with electricity production.
Another way in which ENGOs interact with the presence of stigma to increase the likelihood of green power adoption is by creating legitimacy for alternative, stigma-reducing technology. Environmental organizations can help utilities realize that the effective development of green practices may actually reduce the stigma associated with dirty coal. In other words, ENGOs may be able to translate environmental risks caused by pollution as opportunities for growth while also offsetting marketing and administrative costs by mobilizing their constituents to join in the programs and by providing education about consumer choices. To deal with the uncertainty around lack of demand, utilities that seek to maximize their use of the clean energy program must engage in aggressive marketing and administration of the program. Research indicates that consumers can be convinced to overlook price differentials if they get more information about different energy options (Press and Arnould, 2009 ). The more uncertainty there is about consumer demand, the greater the need for marketing; however, a by-product of proactive marketing of green power is that it cuts into programs' profitability. Some programs have actually shut down because marketing and administrative costs have exceeded revenue from the sale of green power. Environmental groups may be especially effective in helping utilities that own highly polluting plants to adopt and implement green power programs by offsetting their marketing costs through their own awareness campaigns. Environmental organizations may supplement utilities' implementation by direct collaboration with utility companies and by education efforts that reach out to the general public. Dozens of local environmental groups exist that seek to educate consumers about green power options. For example, the Capitol Hill Energy Cooperative in Washington D.C. seeks to 'address renewable energy and environmental issues that are of concern to neighbors in the Capitol Hill area of Washington, D.C. by promoting and educating the community about sustainable energy choices'.
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Hypothesis 3: The presence of ENGOs will positively moderate the effect of ownership of blacklisted coal power plants on the adoption and development of green power programs.
Data and methods
Our dataset consists of annual observations of all U.S. electric utilities from 2002 to 2010. We measure the adoption of green power programs using a dummy variable with the value 1 if a utility launched a green power program in a year and 0 otherwise. Once a utility adopts a green power program, it is dropped from the analysis for the remaining years. We measure the growth of green power programs as the proportion of total customers that buy green power. Data on U.S. utilities' adoption and implementation of green power programs was obtained from the 'Form EIA-861 Database' made public by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) within the U.S. Department of Energy. 9 While we recognize that this is not the only possible measure of program growth-for example, the size of the purchase is an alternative measure-this is the only measure for which data is available. 
Main predictor variables
We measure strength of the environmental movement in a local region as the density of ENGOs-we use data from the Bureau of Labor statistics about the number of environmental and conservation organizations in a county (NAICS 813312) . This variable is standardized by county population-measured as the number of ENGOs per 10 000 residents-and was lagged by one year. 10 We measured blacklisted power plants using the 'dirty kilowatts' measure developed by the environmental organization EIP in 2006, the most recent year available.
11 By using data from 2006, we assume that utilities that were heavy polluters in that year were also heavy polluters between 2002 and 2006. We argue that this is a realistic assumption because heavy polluting power plants were built three or more decades ago, when environmental regulation was less stringent. Indeed, it is highly unlikely that utilities that owned a polluting coal power plant after 2006 did not own it a few years before because the most polluting power plants are old. 12 We also argue that, although the measure is developed by an environmental organization and not by journalists, it is likely to be objective because it uses data from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Energy's Energy to rank the most polluting U.S. power plants on carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide and mercury emissions. We aggregate the rankings by utility and code this variable as 1 if the utility has one or more power plants in the dirty kilowatts list and 0 otherwise. 
Covariates
We control for utilities' size using annual revenue-the natural logarithm was applied to stabilize skew in the data. We control for generating plant operation because utilities that operate generating plants may have an incentive to expand their portfolio and invest in renewable energy in anticipation of future carbon legislation at the national level. This measure was coded as 1 when a utility operated a generating plant and 0 otherwise. Data for revenue and generating plant was obtained from the Energy Information Administration. Because most of the renewable energy is produced from wind power, we control for states' wind power potential using data from the American Wind Energy Association about states'
10 We recognize that our measure is imperfect because it relies on a single source; however, compiling a nationwide 'peak list' using different types of sources, as recommended by scholars of social movement organizations (Andrews et al., 2016) , is not feasible. Because the Bureau of Labor statistics quarterly count of employment relies on data provided by employers, our data underestimate the number of nonprofit organizations that rely on part-time or volunteer work. 11 While we would prefer an annual measure of pollution that is developed by journalists (which are more likely to be neutral than environmental nonprofits in pushing for green energy), such a measure is unavailable. 12 According to a 2013 report on coal power plants, 'about half the plants range from 40 to 60 years old, making them horribly inefficient and prone to the dirtiest levels of carbon pollution'. See http:// thinkprogress.org/climate/2013/09/13/2619891/50-power-plants-12-percent-carbon/# 13 It is difficult to know the exact values of pollutants because the data used to generate the dirty kilowatts list is based on company self-reports. Moreover, we are interested in the perceived risk associated with inclusion in the list, not in measuring the exact environmental risk of each power plant. For these reasons, we consider that a dummy variable is appropriate to estimate utilities' perceived environmental risk.
wind resources. 14 Utilities in states with high-quality wind are more likely to invest in wind farms than utilities in states with moderate-or low-quality wind, since the potential energy produced from wind is directly proportional to the cube of the wind speed. We apply the natural logarithm to stabilize skew in the wind power potential. We also include a control for electricity price, using data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration. 15 This measure includes the average retail price for electricity-cents per kilowatt hour-by state, and was lagged by 1 year. We create a measure that taps the degree to which a state's regulatory environment is supportive of renewable energy using the Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE). 16 We construct a measure of renewable energy policies adopted annually by each state in which a utility operates, which ranged between 0 (no renewable energy policies) and 11 (the maximum number of policies). This measure includes different types of rules, regulations and policies for renewable energy: for example, Public Benefits Funds, Portfolio Standards/Set Asides, Net Metering, Interconnection Standards, Contractor Licensing Requirements, Equipment Certification Requirements, Solar/Wind Access Policy, Construction and Design Policies and Mandatory Utility Green Power Option. 17 We also control for communities' income because green power programs usually require paying a premium for electricity. We use the mean household income by county, available from the 2000 U.S. Census bureau, and we average it for the total number of counties in which utilities operate. We control for the political orientation in a local region because support for renewable energy projects is associated with ideology (Smith and Klick 2007) . We measured political ideology as the percent of votes in a county for the Democratic Party candidate during the 2000 presidential elections-we obtained data from David Leip's Atlas of Presidential Elections. 18 We measure the strength of the fossil fuel extraction industries using data from the Bureau of Labor statistics about the number of oil and gas extraction companies (NAICS 211) and coal mining (NAICS 2121) companies in a county. 19 These variables are standardized by county population-measured as the number of companies per 10 000 residents-and lagged by 1 year. We also include dummy variables for different types of utility ownership: cooperative, municipal and political subdivision-investor is used as a baseline-using data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration. 20 We included controls for location in different utility entities because utilities may be restricted in their ability to power programs because, as the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA) put it, 'Co-ops put consumers first because the consumers are the owners. In addition, co-ops are locally owned and operated. When members call the co-op, they are talking with their neighbors. And both of these aspects combine to make co-ops more responsive since members are the owners and they are accountable to their own neighbors and communities'. See NRECA's website, accessed at http://www.nreca.coop/press/CoopStories/Pages/default.aspx. For information about initiate large green power projects due to transmission issues-we do not present these results due to space limitation. 21 To track growth in green power consumption, we employ a standard growth model, predicting consumption at time t holding constant the value of consumption at tÀ1 (Stuart, 2000) . We, therefore, include a lagged dependent variable to account for growth. 22 Tables 1 and 2 present descriptive statistics for the main variables used to estimate the adoption and growth of green power programs.
Estimations
Event history models are used in analyses that seek to understand why some units of analysis experience certain events while others do not. These models seek to understand why some units of analysis experience events sooner and others experience them later or not at all. The conceptual difference between using a more conventional logit model and a hazard model is whether one looks at electric utilities as 'companies without green power', as in a logit analysis, or as 'companies that have not yet adopted green power', as in a hazard analysis (BoxSteffensmeier and Jones, 1997 Jones, , 2004 . We use Cox proportional hazards model with exact marginal likelihood because of ties in our data-see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) . The estimation of proportional hazards models when hazards are nonproportional can result in biased estimates, incorrect standard errors and faulty inferences about the impact of independent variables (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). We use the Grambsch and Therneau tests for nonproportional hazards and find that all predictors have proportional hazards. 23 Results from Cox models are similar to the results from panel logistic regression-these results are available upon request. For the analysis of the growth of green power programs, we use generalized estimating equations with family-binomial and link-logit, and robust standard errors. This analysis is appropriate when the dependent variable is a proportion or a fraction-see Papke and Wooldridge (1996) or Baum (2008) . 24 Because the data used in the analysis of the growth of green power programs is truncated-only utilities that adopted green power programs will grow the program-we checked for selection bias the U.S. Energy Information Agency EIA data, see http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia861/index. html 21 U.S. utilities are grouped in eight regional entities, with different transmission capabilities: Midwest Reliability Organization (MRO), Florida Reliability Coordinating Council (FRCC), Northeast Power Coordinating Council (NPCC), Reliability First Corporation (RFC), SERC Reliability Corporation (SERC), Southwest Power Pool, (SPP), Texas Regional Entity (TRE), and Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC). We included dummy variables for these entities-the overall findings did not change when these variables were included. 22 We also included a control for the deregulation of electricity markets, since deregulation could affect utilities' decision to launch green power programs. We collected data on electricity deregulation using data from Electric Choice, a company that maintains a database of states with deregulated gas and electricity markets. This variable was measured as a 1 if a utility operated in a state with a deregulated market and a 0 otherwise. We do not include this variable in the main results since it does not change the main results. 23 As an alternative, we use panel logistic regression with random effects-we do not report these results because they are very similar to those from Cox proportional hazards model with exact marginal likelihood. 24 All models were run in STATA 13.
Technology stigma and secondary stakeholder activism Table 1 . Means, standard deviations and correlation coefficients for estimates of green power programs' adoption using Heckman sample selection models; results from these models, however, show that selection bias is not a problem. 
Results
Tables 3 and 4 present the results of a nested set of models designed to test the above hypotheses. The first model in Table 3 presents the effect of controls, and the second model presents the effect of polluting technology stigma-results from this model show that utilities that own a dirty coal power plant are 2.15 more likely to adopt a green power program than other utilities, a value that is statistically significant (P < 0.01). The third model examines the effect of the environmental movement on the adoption of green power programs. We find support for the argument that the density of environmental organizations influences utilities decision to adopt green power programs; an increase of one ENGO per 10 000 residents in a region leads to a 1.4 increase in the likelihood that a utility adopts a green power program (P < 0.05). The fourth model shows the effect of the interaction between ENGOs and dirty coal; utilities that own a dirty coal power plant and are located in a region with an additional ENGO per 10 000 residents are 40 times more likely to adopt a green power program than other utilities. Thus, the results in Table 4 show support for all three hypotheses.
Table 3 also shows that factors such as revenue and electricity price influence the adoption of green power programs; yet, while the effect of revenue is positive (higher revenue increases the likelihood of adoption), the effect of electricity price is negative (higher price decreases the likelihood of adoption). Similarly, cooperative ownership, location in affluent communities and location in communities with a pro-Democratic political orientation influences the adoption of green power programs. More specifically, utilities that are cooperatively owned and are located in high-income and pro-Democratic counties are more likely to adopt green power programs. 26 The presence of oil and gas extraction industries in regions where utilities operate, however, decreases the likelihood of adoption of green power programs. Table 4 shows the results of models about the growth of green power programs. The first model in Table 4 presents the effects of controls and the second model presents the effects of dirty coal; the second model shows that utilities that own highly polluting power plants have 0.67% more green power customers than other utilities (P < 0.05). Model 3 presents the effects of environmental organizations for the growth in consumption of green power programs. This model shows that an increase of one in the number of ENGOs per 10 000 residents leads to an increase of 0.26 in the number of green power customers (P ¼ 0.05). Model 4 adds the interaction effect between ENGOs and polluting technology stigma; this effect is statistically significant (P ¼ 0.01). Taken together, results in Tables 3 and 4 show that hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 are supported: the adoption and development of green power programs is shaped by technology pollution stigma, the presence of local ENGOs, and by the interaction between these two factors.
25 The chi-square value in the Wald test of independent equations for various Heckman selection models that included variables that influenced the adoption of green power programs in the first stage-but not the second stage-were very small and nonsignificant. 26 We did not find that pro-Democrat ideology moderated the impact of ENGOs on green power program growth as one might expect following political opportunity structure theory.
Although not the primary focus of our analysis, the effects of the control variables are worth discussing. The variables utility revenue, price of electricity, resident income, political orientation of the population, presence of oil and gas extraction industry and cooperative ownership have significant effect on the adoption of green power programs but, with the exception of income, not on the growth of the programs. These findings suggest that adoption of green power is influenced by economic, social and political factors; yet, the growth of the Note: *P<0.05; **P<0.01; ***P<0.001. program is influenced primarily by economic factors. The decision to adoption green power programs is, therefore, based not only on the availability of financial resources but also on the political orientation of the residents and on the utilities' ownership. These findings are consistent with results from surveys showing that support for renewable energy is significantly higher among Democrats than among Republicans, and with arguments that electric cooperatives are 'trailblazers' in community wind and solar projects. 27 When it comes to the implementation of the green power programs, however, the profitability of the investment (as measured by the proxy variables wind potential and income) is the main driver of growth (aside from the presence of technology stigma and environmental groups). Taken together, these results suggest that, while change can result from various factors, sustained change results primarily from economic factors such as excellent wind potential that makes wind farm investments financially attractive, or affluent residents who are willing to pay a premium for clean energy.
To aid in the interpretation of the moderator effects tested in hypothesis 3, we include Figure 1 , which shows the predicted probabilities of the growth of green power programs. This figure shows how the effects of ENGOs and ownership of highly polluting fossil fuel plants combine to influence growth in green power sales. Graphing the predicted proportion of sales reveals that the effectiveness of ENGOs in promoting green power development depends on whether the utility owns highly polluting fossil fuel power plants. Utilities that own highly polluting power plants are much more sensitive to ENGO assistance in marketing and implementing the program. A standard deviation increase in the ENGO density in a high-pollution utility roughly doubles (2.25 times) the proportion of green power sales. The same increase in ENGO density in a low pollution owning utility has no such effect.
Discussion and conclusion
The results of our analyses show that energy companies are more likely to adopt green power and increase in green power sales when they have previously used 'dirty coal' technology. Moreover, the presence of environmental NGOs positively moderates the impact of dirty coal. We argue that this interaction effect is the result of activists' ability to enhance the stigma associated with coal and to promote green power as a feasible remedy to this stigma. Thus, environmental activists have two functions in growing the market for green power: stigmatizing coal energy as dirty and opening a pathway for green power as a clean alternative.
This study contributes to theories of social movements and markets by demonstrating how social movement challengers can change incumbents' behaviors and encourage them to enter new markets. Social movements do this by creating stigma around the old technologies used by incumbents while simultaneously promoting technologies associated with the new market as a stigma dilution strategy. Drawing upon research on reputation building (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Fombrun, 1996; Roberts and Dowling, 2002) and organizational stigma (Devers et al., 2009; Vergne and Durand, 2010; Carberry and King, 2012; Desai, 2011; McDonnell and King, 2013; Phillips et al., 2013; Piazza and Perretto, 2015) , 27 See http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/23/two-thirds-of-americans-give-priority-to-de veloping-alternative-energy-over-fossil-fuels/. See also https://www.electric.coop/cooperativeslauded-as-trailblazers-in-community-solar/ we demonstrate that firms facing a polluting technology stigma, especially when facing movement challengers, are more likely to invest in 'clean' technologies. Thus, our research identifies a previously unexamined process that contributes to the paradox of firms that simultaneously engage in 'bad deeds' and in 'good deeds' (Lange and Washburn, 2012; Mattingly and Berman 2006; Tang et al., 2015) . Thus, our findings support the claim that social movements contribute to market emergence (Haveman and Rao, 1997; Schneiberg, 2002; Sine et al., 2005; Bartley, 2007; Haveman et al., 2007; Weber et al., 2008; Sine and Lee, 2009; Hiatt et al., 2009) ; however, our analysis offers nuance to this claim by showing that activism has both direct and indirect influences on firms' decision to move into a new market. Environmental groups play an important role in the greening of the energy supply because they collect data for the 'dirty kilowatts' list, publicize the list, and organize 'beyond coal' campaigns that target polluting power plants and promote clean energy. Thus, environmental groups' influence is exercised at three stages: first, they create the stigma by identifying polluters and developing stigmatizing labels; second, they amplify the stigma by disseminating it through mass media and by naming and shaming the worst offenders; third, they dilute the stigma for companies that invest in green power. We argue that stigmatization is an important 'social skill' that social movements and other challengers may use when seeking to destabilize the position of incumbents in otherwise stable fields (see Fligstein, 2001 , p. 112 for a similar point; Fligstein and McAdam, 2012) .
Anecdotal evidence suggests that environmental groups' influence is exercised mainly by organizing protests against coal power plants or filing lawsuits against utilities that invest in fossil fuels. For example, when TXU-the largest electric utility in Texas-obtained a fasttrack order to build 11 new coal-burning power plants in 2005, a number of environmental groups sued the governor and argued that this order exceeded his authority. They also sued the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, trying to stop permits for the new power plants, launched an 'ad blitz' campaign in the regional media and staged 'die-in' protests in front of TXU's financiers' offices. As a result of these tactics, TXU decided to build fewer coal power plants, to increase investments in energy efficiency and to double its purchase of wind power (Vasi, 2011, p. 177) . These public demonstrations of protest put pressure on firms due to the reputational threat they create for the targeted companies (King 2008) . Utility companies likely adopt green power programs as a way to avoid stigmatization resulting from these threats. This study also speaks to the effects of polluting technology stigma and social movements on the growth of a market for green consumption. Environmental organizations can contribute to the growth of green power programs primarily through marketing. For example, Xcel Energy formed a partnership for community-based marketing with a number of environmental organizations such as Western Resources Advocates (WRA). This initiative sought to 'lend credibility to the product and the marketing message and use grassroots organizing techniques to reach a broader set of potential customers cost-effectively' (Mayer et al., 1999, p. 5) . Initially, WRA was in disagreement with Xcel over the pricing of the program and WRA wanted to use a marketing strategy that highlighted the negative impacts of Xcel's coal power plants. The disagreements were overcome after Xcel conducted a National Environmental Policy Act review and WRA decided to use a marketing strategy that 'accentuates the positive'. As WRA organizers argued, environmental groups' strong involvement in the Windsource program contributed decisively to the fact that this program was number one in the country for a few consecutive years, despite the fact that Xcel spent less than other utilities on marketing (Vasi 2011, p. 173) .
Companies that own polluting power plants face a stigma that is amplified by the actions of movement challengers and mass media, while those that own renewable energy projects are not similarly stigmatized. Despite the fact that we were unable to collect data about the press coverage of all companies in our analyses, we found significant evidence that mass media stigmatizes polluting power plants. Thus, many newspaper articles mention specific power plants that have been blacklisted by the EIP's dirty kilowatts list; for example, 'Anne Arundel's power plant complex in Pasadena is one of the top mercury polluters in the nation, according to a new report. Combined, the Wagner and Brandon Shores plants owned by Constellation Energy ranked 32nd-worst out of the nation's 378 largest plants for total mercury pollution, according to "Dirty Kilowatts". The annual report was issued by the EIP Thursday to highlight the contribution coal-burning power plants make to unhealthy air and global warming.' 28 Moreover, numerous articles simultaneously stigmatize coal power plants and build support for clean energy by quoting renewable energy advocates: consider this statement from a Wisconsin newspaper article: 'Ryan Schryver, Clean Wisconsin's wind power advocate, called the proposal a great example of the "choice that we have to make regarding our energy production". "We have to begin to wean ourselves off of dirty coal, and wind power is one of the best energy sources that we have to do that. We hope that the Public Service Commission agrees and focuses more on developing renewable energy sources like wind, solar and biofuels that can help build a new clean energy economy instead of perpetuating our dependence on dirty coal", Schryver said.' 29 Additionally, our study suggests that electric utilities facing a polluting technology stigma invest in renewable energy technology in order to improve their corporate image and to receive good press. They are moving into a 'good' technology market to make up for their membership in a 'bad' technology market. While we were not able to collect data on publicity following the adoption of green power programs for all companies in our dataset, we found substantial evidence that companies received good press after the adoption of green power. Consider the positive press coverage that followed TXU's decision to invest in solar energy in 2010. When TXU Energy started offering solar power to its consumers, elected officials and environmental NGOs were quick to praise the company. Texas State Representative Linda Harper-Brown stated: 'Texas is leading the nation in alternative energy sources. Solar power is an excellent source of energy but making it affordable has been difficult until now. With the help of TXU Energy, the citizens of North Texas will be able to afford solar power and will have another option to lower their energy bills.' Similarly, a the director of the Texas office of the Environmental Defense Fund stated: 'Today marks a new chapter in bringing renewable energy to Texas on a mass scale. Thanks to leading companies like TXU Energy and SolarCity, advancing sustainable energy practices is taking a big step forward today.'
30 Consider also how Mid-American Energy uses its green power program to present a positive corporate vision: 'We've always had ambitious goals, especially in exploring ways to diversify our energy production and provide lower rates for our customers. Our customers want more renewable energy -91% of those we asked say it's important to utilize renewable resources like wind and solar. We couldn't agree more. And we're doing it with minimal cost impact to our customers. In April 2016, we announced our 100% renewable vision; we want to provide 100% renewable energy for our customers.'
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Anecdotal evidence also indicates that environmental groups influence the growth of green power consumption primarily by persuading consumers concerned about the risks of pollution that wind and solar are attractive and viable sources of energy. For example, environmental organizations often emphasize that, although it is immaterial, green power is essential for addressing global climate change. Consider the Center for Resource Solutions' (CRS) strategy to inform electricity customers: 'A staggering 98 percent of electricity in the United States comes from non-renewable resources such as coal, natural gas, and nuclear power. Using non-renewable resources to create electricity produces more harmful emissions linked to global warming than any other human activity. The remaining two percent of U.S. electricity generated from clean, renewable resources-such as wind, solar, geothermal, small hydro-electric and biomass-produce dramatically less air pollution and have significantly smaller environmental impacts.'
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Our research has a number of limitations that point to avenues for further research. benefits plays out in more competitive environments. Since renewable energy can be purchased by any corporation, it is important to know whether corporations' decision to buy green power or to adopt other green technologies is also influenced by technology stigma and social movements. Thus, a promising direction is to explore if polluting technology stigma and environmental activism have similar effects in other industries. Although the electric utility industry is more regulated and less competitive than other industries, we anticipate that technology dilution strategies are employed by firms in any industry in which path dependence makes it difficult to abandon polluting technologies-i.e. the petrochemical, mining or manufacturing industries. Another promising direction is to examine not only individual but also collective responses to polluting technology stigma. For example, firms in industries where stigmatized technologies are widely used-such as the natural gas industry, which uses the controversial drilling method of hydraulic fracturing-may respond not only by individually attempting to dilute the stigma but also by joining forces and attempting to change perceptions of stigma through lobbying and public relations campaigns organized by industry associations. Finally, another interesting future direction is to examine if stigmatized companies also use strategies consisting of the adoption of CSR practices that are not technology-related-for example, firms affected by polluting technology stigma may attempt to improve their reputation by adopting various social programs and supporting local community groups.
